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Harris: Discovery in Criminal Proceedings
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Not many years ago an attorney in a civil case would have been
shocked and angered if ordered by the court to stipulate to undisputed
facts, or to allow discovery of evidence in his possession. Today
discovery and pretrial conferences are generally accepted in litigation
between parties. The result is a less spectacular but more efficient
system of justice. On the criminal side of the docket, however, discovery is generally frowned upon if not openly discouraged. This
often results in expensive trials, many of which could have been
avoided by the simple expedient of an exchange of evidence.
This note explores the general area of discovery as allowed in the
Florida criminal courts. Discovery in civil cases and the many and
varied problems raised in the federal criminal courts by recent Supreme Court decisions are not discussed. As is readily apparent from
a cursory reading of the cases, the law is vague in some areas.
COMMON LAW

It is generally conceded that the accused has no common law right
of pretrial inspection of evidence in the possession of the prosecution?
The principle that the defendant may not be forced to incriminate
himself usually prevents discovery by the state.2 Some courts will
allow inspection of a statement when the motion shows that the statement might be material.3 In relation to written statements a distinction should be made between the right to pretrial discovery and the
right of inspection at the trial itself. 4 Assuming that the right to
discovery exists in a particular jurisdiction, its allowance is usually
5
within the discretion of the court.

'Shores

v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949); Walker v. People, 126

Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); Dell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293
(1939); The King v. Holland, 4 D. & E. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792).
2State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881

(1952); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St.

397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
3
See Annot., 52 A.L.R. 212 (1928).
4See United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.

Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932).
3See Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P.2d 793 (1945); Padgett v. State,
64 Fla. 389, 59 So. 946 (1912); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y.
24, 30, 156 N.E. 84, 85 (1927) (dictumn).
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IN FLORIDA

By express constitutional, and statutory7 provision the accused in
Florida has the right to compulsory process for the attendance of
8
witnesses in his favor. When applied to a subpoena duces tecum,
these provisions appear to give a defendant an unqualified right to
discovery. But the actual picture as reflected in the court opinions is
to the contrary. As early as 1912, the Florida Supreme Court in
Padgett v. State0 held that the granting of discovery to the accused is
within the discretion of the trial court, "and this discretion will be
reviewed only for the purpose of ascertaining if the defendant was in
fact surprised."'10 Except when modified by statute,"" the present
Florida law appears to follow the discretionary rationale adopted in
12
the Padgett decision.
Authorized by Statute
Section 909.18 of Florida Statutes 1959 provides:
"When . . . the evidence of the state shall relate to ballistics,
fingerprints, blood, semen, or other stains, or documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or other tangible
things, upon motion showing good cause therefor, and upon
notice to the prosecuting attorney, the court .. . may order
the state to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing . . . of any designated papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or other tangible things."
oFLA. CONsr. Deci. of Rights §11.
7FLA. STAT. §§932.02,.25 (1959).
BA person other than a clerk or custodian of public records may be required
to produce designated books and papers by a writ commonly called a subpoena
duces tecum. This writ may be used only to produce writings that are to be
introduced into evidence; it is not available to force production of writings that
are to be used merely to refresh a witness's memory. Pelton Motors v. Superior
Court, 120 Cal. App. 2d 565, 261 P.2d 275 (1953); State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67
A.2d 298 (1949); State v. Yee Guck, 99 Ore. 231, 195 Pac. 363 (1921); see WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EvIDENCE §706 (12th ed. 1955).
964 Fla. 1389, 59 So. 946 (1912).
ioId. at 1396, 59 So. at 949.
-lSee discussions infra under headings "Authorized by Statute" and "Grand
Jury Testimony."
12See discussion infra under heading "Non-Grand Jury Testimony."
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The United States Supreme Court has held that similar statutory provisions do not give an unqualified right of discovery, 13 and has held
that the granting of discovery under them is within the discretion
of the court. 14 A similar interpretation of the Florida statute is
indicated by the use in the statute of the words may order rather
than shall order. Since the Florida Court had held, prior to the adoption of the statute, that the allowance of discovery was within the
court's discretion, this interpretation would lead to the conclusion that
the statute was superfluous. Therefore, it is concluded that the
statute grants an absolute right to the discovery of objects contemplated and embraced within its coverage - assuming that the requirements of showing good cause have been met. No decision has been
found on this point; the Florida Court has confined itself to determination of the scope of the statute.
In the first case interpreting the statute, 15 the Florida Court held
that confessions were not contemplated by the provision and could
not be discovered under its authority. This holding has been reinforced by later decisions. 16 Likewise, statements of accomplices may
not be discovered. 7 Ballistic reports of F. B. I. agents, when they are
nothing more than the outline of testimony the examiner could give
at trial, are also outside the scope of the statute.1 8 Furthermore, the
statute places no affirmative duty upon the state to make further tests
or to collect evidence for the defendant, 19 but it does require the defendant to take affirmative action in order not to waive any rights
given him.

20

By analogy to confessions, the Attorney General of

Florida has ruled that the statute does not give a drunken driver the
2
right to have a copy of a drunkometer report. '
These cases indicate what evidence is not discoverable under the
statute; the question remains as to what is discoverable. Some indi3Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
14Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949), construing FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16; State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941).
"-Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
16Ezzell v. State, 88 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1956); cf. Urga v. State, 104 So.2d 43 (2d

D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
17Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958).
18Ezzell v. State, 88 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1956).

19Ibid. (fingerprints).
20Drozewski v. State, 84 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1955);
(Fla. 1955).
210. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 057-78 (Mar. 22, 1957).
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cation of this may be found in Ezzell v. State.2 2 Any further attempt
to describe the scope of the statute in detail would probably be useless
at the present time. It is safe to say, however, that unless objects are
specifically mentioned in the statute they are not discoverable under
its authority.
GrandJury Testimony
A traditional cloud of secrecy normally renders grand jury testimony non-discoverable. Section 905.27 of Florida Statutes 1959 provides that grand jury testimony need not be disclosed
"except when required by a court to disclose the testimony of
a witness examined before the grand jury for the purpose of
ascertaining whether it is consistent with that of the witness
given before the court, or to disclose the testimony given before
the grand jury by any person upon a charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial therefor,
or when permitted by the court in the furtherance of justice."
In interpreting this provision the Florida Court, in four important
cases, has developed a well-defined procedure that must be followed.
For the sake of completeness, these cases will be treated separately
and chronologically.
The first case - a landmark decision in the field of Florida criminal
discovery -is State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell23 In this case the court
reporter was present in the grand jury room and transcribed the testimony of witnesses. During the trial the defendant moved for the production of the transcribed testimony. The trial judge issued a subpoena duces tecum but later refused to enforce it. The defendant
then instituted a mandamus proceeding to require enforcement. In
24
granting mandamus, the Florida Supreme Court said:
"Nor is this an attempt ... to coerce the respondent judge
to order turned over to the defendant's counsel memoranda
belonging to and in the possession of the State's attorney or his
representatives .... In this case, the documents sought to be
2288 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1956).
23123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936).
24d. at 797, 167 So. at 691.
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inspected are not in the possession of the prosecuting authorities, as such. On the contrary, such transcription as exists, and
such as is wanted to be inspected, is in the hands of the
witness ..."
The next case to arise was Trafficante v. State.2
The defendants
were indicted by the grand jury on a charge of bribery. Prior to trial
the defense counsel moved for a transcript of testimony of one of the
state's witnesses given at the grand jury hearing. This motion was
denied. After the witness had testified on direct examination, but
before cross-examination had begun, defense counsel made a sworn
application for a subpoena duces tecum directed to the official court
reporter, alleging that the testimony given by the witness on direct
examination was in conflict with that given by him before the grand
jury. The defendant offered proof of this inconsistency. Both the
motion and the offer of proof were denied by the trial court. On
appeal the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the first
motion but reversed the court's denial of the second. In remanding
the case the Court adopted a procedure for handling future cases
which had been established in another case. 2G Thus, when a motion
for production of grand jury testimony is made the trial court should
examine the grand jury testimony to determine its materiality or
privilege. If the court decides that this testimony is relevant and
material, it must allow its discovery under the authority of State ex
rel. Brown v. Dewell.27
The next case to color the developing picture was Gordon v.
State.28 Two of the defendants were charged with perjury before the
grand jury, and two were charged with subornation of perjury. The
state had access to a transcript of voluminous grand jury testimony.
The defendants moved for production of this testimony. The trial
judge denied the motion except in so far as it related to the testimony
of any witness who had testified before the grand jury and would be
called to testify personally in behalf of the state at the trial. The
Florida Supreme Court held that the ruling was correct except as it
applied to the testimony of the defendants before the grand jury, and
that the defendants were entitled to a transcript of their testimony

2592 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1957).

26Vann v. State, 85 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
27The Court in this case held that the defendant had the right to have hrought
into court any materialevidence.
28104 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
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by "common justice, much less the specific language of the statute
.... "29
Further, the Court held that "subornation of the particular
perjury is within the spirit, if not the letter, of the controlling
statute." 30 Thus a defendant charged with subornation has the same
right to discovery as one charged with actual perjury.
The last case in the series is Minton v. State.31 Prior to trial the
defendant moved for a written grand jury report. This was denied.
While cross-examining a state's witness, the defendant moved for
production of the witness's testimony before the grand jury "to determine whether he is testifying to the same thing at this time as he
did then." This was also denied. Both denials were affirmed by the
Second District Court of Appeal. On certiorari, the Florida Supreme
32
Court affirmed. As to the first motion, the Court said:
"[E]xcept as to grand jury testimony upon which a charge of
perjury or subornation of perjury is based - an accused in a
criminal case has no right to inspect, in advance of trial, the
grand jury testimony of the witnesses who will be called by the
State to testify against him at the trial for the purpose of preparing his defense."
In affirming the denial of the second motion the Court settled
an apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals' decision and its
33
decision in the Trafficante case:
"Here, the motion . . . [was] based on pure
speculation, if not on curiosity.... [Iun Trafficante
motion, sworn to upon information and belief ....
tive allegation of conflict is entirely different from
based at most on surmise and speculation ......

surmise or
there was a
This posithe motion,

The Court also held that the trial judge will not be required in
all cases to examine the testimony in order to determine its materiality, even when there is a sworn application. Leaving the final
decision in the trial court's discretion, it noted: 34
291d. at 537.
3olbid.

31107 So.2d 143 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), aff'd, 113 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
32113 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla. 1959).
s3Id. at 365.

347d. at 367.
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" '[Wihen the subject matter is one as delicate as grand jury
testimony, no fixed rule can be formulated. The Judge should
not be compelled to inspect in all cases; neither should he indiscriminately refuse, but he should exercise his judgment according to the circumstances.' "
In summary, a defendant has no right to discover, prior to trial,
grand jury testimony except that upon which a charge of perjury or
subornation of perjury against him is based. During trial on any
charge, when a motion for discovery is made the trial judge has the
duty to examine the grand jury testimony to determine its materiality.
The final decision on this point rests in the judge's discretion, but
once he determines that the testimony is material he must allow discovery.
One final point should be mentioned. Section 905.27 of Florida
Statutes 1959 states that discovery should be allowed "when permitted by the court in the furtherance of justice." In the light of
the procedures established in the cases discussed above, it is unlikely
that the phrase will have any importance in the further development
of the law.
NON-GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Following the Court's decision in State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,
much confusion arose as to the actual breadth of discovery allowable
under its authority. A subsequent case added this proviso:35
"It extends only to legal or public records that have been
regularly made in due course of legal procedure and as to these
the application must be seasonably made. .

.

. [I]t must be

shown that the evidence sought is material and necessary
to the defendant's cause. It in no sense reaches notes or evidence taken by the prosecuting officer at his expense and by his
private stenographer."
In this case the Court denied discovery of a transcript of testimony
taken at a preliminary hearing by the prosecutor's stenographer. If
anything, this decision merely muddied the waters, for it is not clear
whether the rationale of the denial was based on the type of testimony
35Mclntosh v. State, 139 Fla. 863, 867, 192 So. 183, 185 (1939).
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attempted to be discovered or the time when the motion was made.
The case is often indexed as standing for the rule that a motion for
discovery must be seasonably made.
When next presented with a similar motion the Court denied dis3
covery but in so doing ignored its previous language. It stated: 6
"We are not familiar with any statute or rule of law making
it the duty of a State attorney .. .to deliver to counsel for
defendant a transcript of testimony of State witnesses taken or
made at a conference ... between the State attorney . . . and
the State's witnesses ...
This decision settled the point that the work product of the state
could not be discovered. One important exception to this rule has
developed, however. In Whitaker v. Blackburn37 the Court held that
the work product of the defense could not be discovered by the state
even when used to impeach a state witness on cross-examination. Relying on the Whitaker decision, the trial court in Smith v. State denied
to defense counsel access to the work product of the state which had
been used to impeach a defense witness. The Florida Supreme Court
reversed and allowed discovery,38 holding that a state attorney is a
constitutional officer vested with the power to compel attendance of
witnesses for purposes of discovery. When the testimony thus acquired
is used for impeactiment by the state, it no longer retains the quality
of a private paper or memorandum -the rationale of the Whitaker
case - and thus becomes discoverable by the defense.
Obviously, the problems in this area are not all solved. For example, assuming that the defendant does not have an absolute right
to discovery, does the trial court have the authority to order discovery?
It is submitted that it does. Although Padgett v. State,3 9 which placed
the right to discovery in the court's discretion, was decided many
years ago, language in more recent cases indicates a reaffirmance of
this view. For example, in Urga v. State the Second District Court
of Appeal said: "These cases establish the general rule . . . that a
defendant is not as a matter of right entitled to [discovery] ...."40
Since the state can not appeal from an order granting discovery, and
36McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 527, 21 So.2d 33, 35 (1945).
3774 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
38Smith v. State, 95 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1957).
3964 Fla. 1389, 59 So. 946 (1912).
40104

So.2d 43, 44 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
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since discovery in any case is seldom granted, it is doubtful that this
question will ever be clarified.
New problems are constantly being created by the ingenuity of
counsel. For example, in Bedami v. State4 1 counsel contended that the
county solicitor in conducting hearings to determine whether to
prosecute was in effect acting as a one-man jury. He argued that the
testimony taken at the hearing could be discovered under the authority of section 905.27 of Florida Statutes 1959 and the cases decided
thereunder. 42 Although the court refused to accept the argument and3
denied discovery on the work product theory of McAden v. State,4
the technique used by the defendant is probably indicative of the
future attempts that will be made to circumvent the present doctrines
as to discovery.
CONCLUSION

There should be no need for an argument such as that made in
the Bedami case; the defendant should be allowed to discover and
examine all the evidence in the possession of the state. Likewise, the
state should be allowed to discover, within the constitutional limitation of self-incrimination, all the evidence in the possession of the
defendant. This almost exclusive denial of discovery to the state is
probably one of the major reasons for the Florida courts' denial of
discovery to defendants. This is illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's
famous comment:

44

"Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need
not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least doubt in the minds of any one of
the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and

41112 So.2d 284 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So.2d 496 (Fla.), 80
Sup. Ct. 153 (1960).
42Trafficante v. State, 113 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1959); Gordon v. State, 104 So.2d 524
(Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); Minton
v. State, 107 So.2d 143 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
43155 Fla. 523, 21 So.2d 33 (1945).
44United States v. Grayson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to
see."
Section 909.18 of Florida Statutes 1959 is a good example of this
attitude at work. The statute authorizes discovery for the defendant
only and does so in great detail. As is obvious from the previous discussion, the Florida courts have made short work of it, limiting discovery to a very narrow area.
An attempt at similar legislation in this field would probably meet
with the same narrow interpretation. Therefore, it would seem that
the best method is to begin a search for some new answers to the
problems.
One possible solution is the establishment of a pretrial practice in
criminal cases similar to that used in the civil docket. At this conference, the state and the defense could be required to stipulate to
undisputed facts. Thus the court could allow a free exchange of evidence while expediting the course of the trial. Questions as to the
admissibility of evidence, privileges and immunities claimed by the
parties, and other matters of similar import could be handled at
this preliminary stage rather than at the trial itself.
The advantages of this system have been proved in the civil courts.
Trials could be appreciably shortened in many cases and rendered entirely unnecessary in others. Courts with a smaller trial docket would
have more time to spend on each case, thereby increasing the possibility of reaching a just conclusion.
There are, of course, difficulties to be overcome before the system
can function effectively. Undoubtedly the greatest of these is the
prevailing adverse philosophy underlying the practice of criminal
law. To a certain extent, this attitude is necessary to protect the conflicting interests of the state and the individual. When pretrial
practice first came on the scene in civil cases, it was also vigorously
denounced as contra the adversary philosophy of the American practice of law and hence impracticable and unworkable. Experience has
proved just how well it works. It can and should work in the criminal
field also. In any event, as one writer has put it, "The day has long
since passed when a case is to be tried from ambush." 45
EUGENE W. HARs
45Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements
in Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (1957).
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